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Somersett Owners Ass’n v. Somersett Dev. Co., LTD., 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 35 (July 29, 2021)1
STATUTES OF REPOSE: “SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETE” DEFINED

Summary
This is an appeal following the granting of summary judgment regarding unstable rockery
walls and their unreliable design. The reason for the dismissal stems from the statute of repose,
which is created to allow defendants to be free of liability following a legislatively-determined
amount of time.2 Here, a six-year period is set by the statute of repose.3 The period begins when
the improvement to the property is “substantially complete.”4 Somersett Owners Association
(SOA) wants to recover damages against those involved in the rockery wall design and
construction. However, they failed to give proper support in their argument that they commenced
the action within the six-year period. Therefore, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district
court decision that granted summary judgment.
I.
In 2006, Q & D Construction, Inc. graded the property that would eventually become a
residential area with lots and streets. Parsons Bros Rockeries, Inc., respondent, then constructed
over 13 miles of rockery walls around the lots. This construction ended in December of 2006.
Stantec conducted a final inspection on the rockery was and sent a letter to Somersett Development
Company to inform them of the completed inspection. Somersett then divided the land and sold
the lots to individual builders for housing construction. The rockery walls had an expected lifespan
of at least 50 years, however some began declining as early as 2011. In 2017, two walls collapsed
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on the same day. SOA then hired an inspector to determine if there were defects in the rockery
walls. The inspector concluded that the walls were unstable and the rockery walls deviated from
the original plans. Following this inspection, SOA sued Somersett, Parsons Bros, Q & D, and
Stantec (collectively, respondents) for negligence-based actions. The respondents moved for
summary judgement due to the fact that the six-year statute of repose through NRS 11.202 had
expired. The district court granted the motion, and this appeal followed.
II.
NRS 11.202 restricts bringing suits for construction defects, such as this one, more than 6
years after the “substantial completion” of the improvement to real property in question.5 The
primary question of this de novo review is when the rockery walls achieved substantial completion
with respect to NRS 11.202.6 NRS 11.2055, a companion statute, attempts to define “substantial
completion.”7 The activation specified in NRS 11.2055(1)(a)-(c) did not apply, so this court used
the second provision which stated “the date of substantial completion… must be determined by
the rules of the common law.”8 Both sides endorsed the definition of substantial completion from
the American Institute of Architects (the AIA) which states “the stage in the progress of the work
when the work or designated portion thereof is sufficiently complete in accordance with the
contract documents so that the owner can occupy or utilize the work for its intended use.”9
This court adopted this definition for the purposes of NRS 11.2055(2). Ultimately, SOA
bore the burden of presenting evidence of the circumstances to support the timeliness of the action.
Unless SOA set forth a factual demonstration that the action was brought within the proper time
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frame, or there was an existence of a genuine factual issue, the district court properly granted the
motion for summary judgment. Final project report letters—issued in November and December
2006—were included in the summary judgement record, but there was no argument that these
letters qualified as a start to the statute of repose timing. These letters, under NRS 11.2055(1) are
relevant as they support the conclusion that the rockery walls were “sufficiently complete” under
the AIA’s common law standard. Both factors demonstrate that the walls were substantially
complete in December 2006 at the latest. Therefore, the action brought in 2017 was far outside of
the 6-year restriction set forth in the statute of repose through NRS 11.202.
III
SOA attempts to use First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. v Central Bank & Trust Co. of
Denver to argue that the period of repose should be tolled.10 They argue this is due to Somersett
controlling the homeowner association board until 2013. However, this case is neither controlling
nor persuasive, and therefore is not sufficient. This case presents the option of a waiving rights
under a statute of repose agreement, but this waiver is not present here. Statutes of repose generally
preclude tolling, as that is typically a characteristic of a statute of limitations.11
IV.
SOA failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine factual issue of whether they brought
this suit within the six-year statute of repose under NRS 11.202. The record demonstrates the
period of repose began running in December of 2006, at the latest. Without allegations of fraud or
the subjectivity to tolling, this action extends further than the six-year statute of repose. Therefore,
the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the respondents is affirmed.
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